Summa Theologiae

Thomas Aquinas

Question 23

On the distinction of passions

Article 1

Whether the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible appetites

[Summary of response]

The answer to this question can be gathered from what was said in the first part about the distinction between the powers. It was said in the first part that the object of the concupiscible power is a sensible good or evil taken simply, which is pleasurable or painful. But since the soul sometimes suffers difficulty or conflict in attaining such a good or avoiding such an evil, that very good or evil, insofar as it has the account of something arduous or difficult, is the object of the irascible power. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely pertain to the concupiscible power: e.g., joy, sorrow, love, hate, and the like. But whatever passions regard good or evil under the account of something arduous, as something attainable or avoidable with some difficulty, pertain to the irascible power: e.g., daring, fear, hope, and the like.

Article 3

Whether every passion of the soul has some contrary

Response:

It should be said that only the passion of anger does not have a contrary, neither according to approach and withdrawal, nor according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by an evil already present. And at its presence, the appetite either must succumb, and thus not go beyond the limits of sorrow, which is a passion of the concupiscible appetite, or it must have a movement to attack the offending evil, which pertains to anger. It cannot have a movement towards fleeing, since the evil is supposed as already present or past. And thus there is no passion contrary to anger according to the contrariety of approach and withdrawal. Similarly neither according to the contrariety of good and evil. For to a present evil is opposed a good already attained, which can no longer have the account of something arduous or difficult. And after the attainment of good, no movement remains except the resting of the appetite in the good, which pertains to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible appetite. Hence the movement of anger cannot have any contrary movement of the soul, but only the cessation of movement is opposed to it, as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric, that being mild is opposed to being angry, which is not opposed as a contrary, but as a negation or privation.

Article 4

Whether in a power there can be passions differing in species and not contrary to each other

Response:

It should be said that passions differ according to the different objects that act to arouse these passions. Now the difference of agents can be considered in two ways: according to the species or nature of those agents, as fire differs from water; according to a different active power. And in the passions of the soul, the difference of the agent or mover with respect to the power of moving can be taken by way of likeness to natural agents. For every mover in a certain manner either draws the patient towards itself or repels it away. In drawing it to itself, it does three things in it. First, it gives it an inclination or aptitude to tend to it, as when a light body, which is up, gives lightness to a generated body, through which lightness it has an inclination or aptitude for being up. Secondly, if the generated body is outside its proper place, it gives it motion to its place. Thirdly, it gives it rest in the place when it is reached it, since the same thing causes something to rest in a place as moves it to the place. And we should understand the cause of repulsion in a similar manner.

Now in motions of the appetitive power, the good has as it were an attractive power, while evil has a repulsive power. Therefore the good first causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination, or aptitude, or connaturality to the good, which pertains to the passion of love. And hate, on the side of evil, corresponds to love as its contrary. Secondly, if the good is not yet possessed, it gives the appetitive power a motion to attain the good loved, and this pertains to the passion of desire or concupiscence. And opposed to this, on the side of evil, there is flight or abhorrence. Thirdly, when it has attained the good, it gives the appetite rest in the very good attained, and this pertains to pleasure or joy. To this is opposed, on the side of evil, pain or sadness.

In passions of the irascible power, an aptitude or inclination to pursue good or avoid evil is presupposed from the concupiscible power, which regards good or evil absolutely. And with respect to a good not yet attained, there is hope and despair. With respect to an evil not yet present, there is fear and faring. With respect to an attained good there is no passion in the irascible power, since it no longer has the account of something arduous, as was said above. But from an evil now present there follows the passion of anger.

Thus it is evident that in the concupiscible power there are three pairs of passions, namely love and hate, desire and flight, joy and sadness. Similarly in the irascible power there are three pairs, namely hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger, to which no passion is opposed. Therefore all the passions differing in species are eleven: six in the concupiscible power, and five in the irascible; and all the passions of the soul are contained under these.

Question 24

Question 24

On good and evil in passions of the soul

Article 1

Whether moral good and evil can be found in passions of the soul

Objections:

It seems that moral good and evil cannot be found in passions of the soul.

3. For the Philosopher says in Ethics II that “we are neither praised nor blamed for passions.” But we are praised and blamed according to moral goods and evils. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil.

Response:

It should be said that passions of the soul can be considered in two ways: in one way, in themselves; in another way, insofar as they are subject to the command of reason and will. Therefore if they are considered in themselves, namely inasmuch as they are certain movements of the irrational appetite, there is not in them moral good or evil, which depends on reason, as was said above (q. 18, a. 5). But if they are considered insofar as they are subject to the command of reason and will, there is in them moral good and evil. For the sensitive appetite is closer to reason and will than external members are, and the movements and acts even of the external members are morally good or evil insofar as they are voluntary. Hence much more can the passions themselves, insofar as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are called voluntary either due to being commanded by the will, or due to not being prohibited by the will.

Replies to objections:

3. To the third it should be said that the Philosopher says that we are not praised or blamed according to passions considered absolutely, but he does not remove the possibility of their becoming praiseworthy or blameworthy insofar as they are ordered by reason. Hence he adds, “For not he who is afraid or is angry is praised or blamed, but he who is so in a certain manner,” that is, in accordance with reason or aside from reason.

Article 2

Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally

[Summary of article]

There is an apparent disagreement on this question, caused by a difference of language. The Stoics did not distinguish sense from intellect, nor, consequently, sensitive appetite from intellectual appetite. And therefore by “passion” they did not mean a movement of the sensitive appetite, but an appetitive movement going beyond the rule of reason. Hence Cicero, following their opinion, calls the passions “sicknesses of the soul.”

The Peripatetics, on the other hand, call all movements of the sensitive appetite passions. Hence they regard them as good when moderated by reason, and evil when they are beyond or contrary to¹ the moderation of reason.

Article 3

Whether passions increases or decreases the goodness or badness of an act

Objections:

It seems that any passion always decreases the goodness of a moral act.

1. For everything that impedes the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of a moral act depends, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion impedes the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): “All who take counsel about matters of doubt should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and pity.” Therefore every passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.

Response:

It should be said that as the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul diminishes the goodness of an act; for the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it less good. And this is indeed true if by passions we mean only the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man’s good that the passions themselves be moderated by reason. For since man’s good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be more perfect according as it can extend to more things pertaining to man. Hence no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the external members be directed by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above (q. 17, a. 7), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be regulated by reason.

Thus, as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act, so it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved towards good not only according to his will, but also according to his sensitive appetite, according to Ps. 83:3: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God,” where by “heart” we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by “flesh” the sensitive appetite.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. (1) In one way, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than to do it only from the passion of pity. (2) In another way, they may relate consequently to reason: and this in two ways. (2a) First, by way of overflowing, that is, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that follows in the sensitive appetite is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness. (2b) Secondly, by way of choice, when a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order that, with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite, he may work more promptly. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.

Article 4

Whether any passion is good or evil in its species

Response:

It should be said that it seems the same thing should be said about passions as was said about acts, namely that the species of an act or passion can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is in a natural genus, and taken in this way, moral good and evil do not pertain to the species of an act or passion. In another way, insofar as it pertains to a moral genus, inasmuch as it partakes in the voluntary and in the judgment of reason. And in this way moral good and evil can pertain to the species of a passion, insofar as the object of the passion is in itself in harmony with or in discord with reason, as is evident in the case of “shame,” which is fear of something base, and of “envy,” which is sadness over another’s good. For thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.

Question 25

Question 25

On the order of the passions

Article 2

Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions

Objections:

It seems that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.

1. For the concupiscible power is named from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But “things are named from that which is chief in them” (On the Soul II, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love.

Response:

It should be said that the objects of the desiring power are the good and the evil. Now good naturally comes before evil, because evil is the privation of good. Whence also all the passions of which the object is good naturally come before the passions of which the object is evil, namely each comes before its opposite passion, for since good is sought, the opposite evil is therefore avoided. But good has the account of an end, which comes first in intention but last in execution. Therefore the order of the passions of the desiring power can be looked at either according to intention, or according to attainment. According to attainment, that comes first which first comes to be in that which tends to an end. And it is manifest that everything tending to some end first has a fittingness or proportion to the end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; second, it is moved to the end; third, it rests in the end after its attainment. But the fittingness or proportion of the appetite to the good is love, which is nothing other than an order to rest in the good, while motion to the good is desire or concupiscence, and rest in the good is joy or pleasure. And therefore according to this order, love comes before desire, and desire comes before pleasure. But according to the order of intention it is the other way around, for the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which is the end in a certain way, even as the good itself, as was said above.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that we name something in the way in which we know it, for words are signs of things understood, according to the Philosopher. But for the most part we know the cause through the effect. The effect of love, however, when the thing loved is possessed, is pleasure, while when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence. But as Augustine says in On the Trinity X, “Love is more felt when need makes it known.” Whence among all the passions of the desiring power, concupiscence is the most sensible. And on account of this, the power is named from it.

Article 3

Whether hope is the first of the passions of the irascible power

Objections:

It seems that hope is not the first of the passions of the irascible power.

2. For the difficult is the object of the irascible power. But it seems to be more difficult for someone to seek to overcome a contrary evil which impends as future, which pertains to daring, or which is already present, which pertains to anger, than simply to seek to acquire some good. And similarly it seems to be more difficult to seek to conquer present evil than future evil. Therefore anger seems to be a greater passion than daring, and daring than hope. And thus hope does not seem to be the greatest.

Response:

it is to be said that all the passions of the irascible power imply motion with respect to something, as was said above. But in the irascible power motion with respect to something can be caused by two things, in one way, by the fittingness or proportion to the end by itself, which pertains to love or hate; in another way, by the very presence of good or evil, which pertains to sadness or joy. And there is not caused any passion in the irascible power by the presence of good, as was said, but the passion of anger is caused by the presence of evil. Therefore since in the way of generation or attainment, proportion or fittingness to the end comes before attainment of the end, thence it is that anger, among all the passions of the irascible power, is the last in the order of generation. But among the other passions of the irascible power, which imply a motion following love or hate of good or evil, the passions of which the object is good, namely hope and despair, must come before the passions of which the object is evil, namely daring and fear. Yet so that hope comes before despair, since hope is a motion toward the good according to the account of good, which of its account is attractive, and therefore there is motion to the good through itself. But despair retreats from good, which does not belong to good insofar as it is good, but according to something else, whence it is as though accidental. And for the same reason, fear, since it retreats from evil, comes before daring. And that hope and despair naturally come before fear and daring is manifest from this, that as desire for good is the reason why evil is avoided, so also hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring, for daring follows the hope of victory, and fear follows despair of conquering. Moreover, anger follows daring, for no one is angered, seeking revenge, unless he dares to take revenge, according to what Avicenna says in On Natural Things VI.

Thus it is evident that hope is the first of all the passions of the irascible power. And if we wish to know the order of all the passions according to the way of generation, first are love and hate; second, desire and avoidance; third, hope and despair; fourth, fear and daring; fifth, anger; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow on all the passions, as is said in Ethics II. Yet so that love comes before hate, desire before avoidance, hope before despair, fear before daring, and joy before sadness, as can be gathered from the aforesaid.

Replies to objections:

2. To the second it should be said that the difficult is not the reason for approaching or desiring, but rather the good. And therefore hope, which concerns the good more directly, comes before the others, although daring, or even anger, sometimes concerns a more difficult good.

Question 27

Question 27

On the cause of love

Article 1

Whether good is the only cause of love

Objections:

It seems that good is not the only cause of love.

1. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: “He who loves iniquity, hates his own soul”: else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of love.

Response:

It should be said that as was said above (q. 26, a. 1), love pertains to the appetitive power, which is a passive faculty. Hence its object stands to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the proper cause of love must be that which is the object of love. Now the proper object of love is the good, since as was said above (q. 26, aa. 1,2), love implies a certain kinship or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that evil is never loved except under the account of good, that is to say, insofar as it is good in some respect, and is considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, inasmuch as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in this way that man “loves iniquity,” inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or something of this kind.

Article 2

Whether knowledge is a cause of love

Response:

It should be said that good is the cause of love as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite except as apprehended. And therefore love requires some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethics IX, 5,12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love; and similarly the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Thus knowledge is the cause of love under the same account as good is, which can be loved only if known.

Article 4

Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love

Objections:

It seems that some other passion can be the cause of love.

1. For the Philosopher (Ethics VIII, 3) says that some are loved because of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.

2. Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them, as happens in every friendship based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.

3. Further, Augustine says (On the Trinity X, 1): “When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all, even if we see how beautiful it is.” Therefore hope too is a cause of love.

On the contrary:

All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (City of God XIV, 7,9).

Response:

It should be said that there is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose some love. The reason for this is that every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something or rest in something. Now every movement towards something or rest in something arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing, which pertains to the account of love. Hence it is impossible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love, just as one good is the cause of another.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that when a man loves a thing for the pleasure it gives, his love is indeed caused by pleasure, but that very pleasure is caused in turn by another prior love, for one takes pleasure only in that which is loved in some way.

2. To the second it should be said that desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing’s being loved, as he who desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it.

3. To the third it should be said that hope causes or increases love, both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure, and by reason of desire, because hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is loved.

Question 29

Question 29

On hatred

Article 3

Whether hatred is stronger than love

Objections:

It seems that hatred is stronger than love.

1. For Augustine says (Eighty-three Questions, q. 36): “There is no one who does not flee from pain more than he desires pleasure.” But flight from pain pertains to hatred, while desire for pleasure belongs to love. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

2. Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred, namely when love is turned into hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

3. Further, the affection of the soul is shown by its effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful than on seeking what is pleasant; thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (Eighty-three Questions, q. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

On the contrary:

Good is stronger than evil, since “evil does nothing except in virtue of good,” as Dionysius says (On the Divine Names IV). But hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred.

Response:

It should be said that it is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above stated (a. 2). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely.

But furthermore, love must be absolutely speaking stronger than hatred. For a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to that which is ordered to the end. Now turning away from evil is ordered to the attainment of good as an end. Hence simply speaking the soul’s movement in regard to good is stronger than its movement in regard to evil.

Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. (1) First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For since the perception of sense is in a certain change, when this change has already taken place it is not felt as much as in the moment of being changed. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever, because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second nature. For this reason, too, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (On the Trinity X, 12) that “love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love.” And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. (2) Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. For according to different degrees of good there are different degrees of love, to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Hence a hatred that corresponds to a greater love moves us more than a lesser love does.

Replies to objections:

1. And from this is evident the reply to the first. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure.

2. To the second it should be said that hatred would never overcome love, except on account of a greater love to which the hatred corresponded, as a man loves himself more than a friend, and because he loves himself, hates even his friend, if he opposes him.

3. To the third it should be said that the reason why something works more intensely to repel something hateful is that hatred is felt more.

Question 31

Question 31

On pleasure

Article 5

Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures

[Summary of response]

Pleasure arises not only from objects sensed or understood, but also from the act of sensing or understanding. The pleasure in the very act of understanding exceeds the pleasure in sensing, since understanding is more perfect, better known, and more loved. (No one would prefer being an idiot to being blind.)

The pleasure in spiritual things themselves is also, simply speaking, greater than pleasure in bodily things, due to the good attained, that by which it is attained, and the union with that good. For (1) spiritual good is greater than bodily good, and is more loved (a sign of which is that men abstain from bodily pleasures in order to preserve honor); (2) again, the intellectual part is much nobler and a better knower than the sensitive part; (3) The union with the intellect is more intimate, more perfect, and firmer.

But bodily pleasures are more vehement for us than spiritual pleasures, because (1) sensible things are more known to us than intelligible ones; (2) sensible pleasures involve a bodily change; (3) bodily pleasures are like medicines against bodily defects and annoyances, thus being more felt, and consequently more recognized than spiritual delights.

Question 33

Question 33

On the effects of pleasure

Article 3

Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason

Objections:

It seems that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.

1. For rest contributes very much to the due use of reason; hence the Philosopher says (Physics VII, 3) that “while we sit and rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence”; and it is written (Wis. 8:16): “When I go into my house, I shall rest myself with her,” i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of rest. Therefore it helps rather than hinders the use of reason.

2. Further, things which are not in the same subject do not hinder one another even if they are contraries. But pleasure is in the appetitive part, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive part. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.

3. Further, that which is hindered by another seems to be in a certain manner moved by it. But the use of an apprehensive power moves pleasure rather than being moved by it, since it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.

Response:

It should be said that as is stated in Ethics X, 5, “the pleasures proper to activity increase it . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources are impediments to activity.” There is, then, a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning, and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it, because we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention helps activity.

But bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways. (1) First, by distracting the reason. For as we have just observed, we give much attention to that which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened with respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily pleasure is great, either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind’s attention on itself; or else it hinders it considerably. (2) Secondly, by being contrary to reason. For some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that “bodily pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence, but not the speculative judgment,” to which they are not opposed, “for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles.” In the first way, however, they hinder both judgments. (3) Thirdly, by fettering the reason, inasmuch as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain bodily alteration, greater even than in the other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason, as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that bodily pleasure implies indeed rest of the appetite in the object of pleasure, which rest is sometimes contrary to reason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in both respects it hinders the use of reason.

2. To the second it should be said that the powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part.

3. To the third it should be said that the use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers.

Article 4

Whether pleasure perfects activity

Objections:

It seems that pleasure does not perfect activity.

1. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure hinders the use of reason, as stated above. Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human activity.

Response:

It should be said that pleasure perfects activity in two ways. (1) First, as an end: not indeed inasmuch as an end is that on “account of which a thing is”; but inasmuch as every good which is added to a thing and completes it can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher says (Ethics X, 4) that “pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it,” i.e., inasmuch as to this good, which is activity, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the rest of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. (2) Secondly, as an agent cause; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethics X, 4) that “pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does”; but it does so indirectly, inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more strongly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethics X, 5 that “pleasures increase the activities to which they are proper, and hinder those to which they are not proper.”

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that not every pleasure hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises not from the act of reason, but from the act of the concupiscible power, which act is increased by pleasure. Pleasure that arises from the act of reason, however, strengthens the use of reason.

Question 34

Question 34

On the goodness and badness of pleasures

Article 1

Whether every pleasure is evil

Objections:

It seems that every pleasure is evil.

1. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason seems to be evil in itself, since man’s good is to be “in accord with reason,” as Dionysius says (On the Divine Names IV). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, and so much the more, to the degree that the pleasure is greater. Hence “in sexual pleasures,” which are the greatest of all, “it is impossible to understand anything,” as stated in Ethics VII, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [Cf. Origen, Hom. 6 in Num.] that “at the time of conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Spirit will not be given, even if it be a prophet that fulfills the conjugal duty.” Therefore pleasure is evil in itself, and consequently every pleasure is evil.

On the contrary:

It is written (Ps. 36:4): “Delight in the Lord.” Since, therefore, divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil.

Response:

It should be said that as is said in Ethics X, some have maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest, since also in other respects the ancient philosophers did not distinguish between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (On the Soul III, 3). And they held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as evil, so that men, who are prone to immoderate pleasures, might arrive at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. For since no one can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are found to take pleasure, men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great weight, example moves more than words.

We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a rest of the appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from some activity; hence a twofold explanation may be given for this. (1) The first is on the part of the good in which a man rests with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on accordance or disagreement with reason, as stated above (q. 18, a. 5), just as in the order of nature a thing is said to be natural if it agrees with nature, and unnatural if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a certain natural rest, whereby a thing rests in that which is in accordance with its nature, as for example when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural rest, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so in the moral order there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.

The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions than desires are, which come before the actions in time. Hence, since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil, much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that as was said above, pleasures about an act of reason do not hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but it is the extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body, which do so. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as was said above, (q. 33, a. 3), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad, or by fettering the reason, as in conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But moral evil does not follow from this, as neither is sleep, by which the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason; for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. We say, however, that although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral badness, since it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin, yet it proceeds from a kind of moral badness, namely from the sin of our first parent; for this did not happen in the state of innocence, as was said in the First Part (q. 98, a. 2).

Article 4

Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil

Objections:

It seems that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil.

1. For “that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest” (Metaphysics X, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.

3. Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because “those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those are evil which arise from evil operations,” as stated in Ethics X, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.

Response:

Moral goodness or badness depends chiefly on the will, as was said above (q. 20, a. 1); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the will rests, and the rest of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is judged to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will, since that man who takes pleasure in the works of virtue is good and virtuous, and that man who takes pleasure in evil works is evil.

Pleasures of the sensitive appetite, however, are not the rule of moral goodness and badness, since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them with respect to the account of an end, which in actions has the account of a principle, by which judgment is most of all made, as by a rule or measure.

3. To the third it should be said that since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as was said above (q. 33, a. 4), an activity cannot be perfectly good unless there is also pleasure in the good; for the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus in a certain manner the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.

Question 35

Question 35

On sorrow

Article 6

Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought

[Summary of article]

In itself, the appetite for pleasure is stronger than the shunning of sorrow. For (1) the cause of pleasure is a suitable good, while the cause of pain or sorrow is a unsuitable evil; but good can be totally suitable, whereas nothing can be totally evil. Thus pleasure can be whole and perfect, while pain is always partial. (2) Good is sought on its account, while evil is to be shunned inasmuch as it is the privation of good. But that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else.

But accidentally a man may shun sorrow more than he desires pleasure, and this may happen for three reasons. (1) Love is felt more in the absence of the loved good, and thus love is felt more in sorrow, when the good loved is absent, than in pleasure, when the good loved is present. Consequently, since love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the sorrow is more shunned, since the love that makes one shun the sorrow is felt more strongly. (2) Because the evil that causes sorrow is contrary to a good more well loved than the good that causes the pleasure. (3) Because sorrow impedes not only one pleasure, but all pleasures.

Question 37

Question 37

On the effects of pain or sorrow

Article 1

Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn

Objections:

It seems that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn.

1. For it is written (Is. 26:9): “When thou shalt do thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice”: and further on (verse 16): “In the tribulation of murmuring thy instruction was with them.” But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow in men’s hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning.

3. Further, inner sorrow surpasses outward pain, as was said above (q. 35, a. 7). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.

Response:

It should be said that since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it is necessary that when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, it is withdrawn from the action of another power; for the soul, being one, can only have one intention. And on account of this, if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion of it, it is incompatible with anything else that requires great attention.

Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul’s attention to itself, since it is natural for each thing to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in Prov. 2:4,5: “If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou understand learning.” Consequently if the pain is acute, man is prevented at the time from learning anything: indeed it can be so intense that as long as it lasts a man is unable even to consider that which he knew already. However a difference is to be found here according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering: the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can contribute to the acquisition of learning, especially in regard to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, “in the tribulation of murmuring,” men are more apt to be taught by God.

3. To the third it should be said that external pain arises from harm done to the body, so that it involves bodily alteration more than inner sorrow does, though the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul. Consequently contemplation, which requires complete repose, is hindered more by bodily pain than by inward sorrow. Nevertheless if inward sorrow is very intense, it attracts the intention so that man is unable to learn anything for the first time, wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezekiel (Homily xxii on Ezekiel).

Article 3

Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity

Response:

It should be said that sorrow at times does not so weigh down or absorb the mind as to shut out all movement, internal or external, but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Thus activity can be related to sorrow in two ways. First, as the object of sorrow, and thus sorrow hinders any activity; for that which we do with sorrow, we never do as well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is that the will is the cause of human activity, and so when the activity itself is that about which one is saddened, the activity is necessarily weakened. Secondly, activity may be related to sorrow as to its principle and cause, and such an activity must be increased by sorrow; thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the more one strives to expel sorrow, provided there remains hope of expelling it: otherwise no movement or action would result from that sorrow.

Question 38

Question 38

On remedies for sorrow or pain

(1) pleasure in general; (2) weeping; (3) the sympathy of friends; (4) contemplation of truth; (5) sleep and bathing.

Article 1

Whether pain or sorrow is mitigated by any pleasure

The Philosopher says (Ethics VII, 14) that “sorrow is expelled by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense.”

Response:

It should be said that as is evident from what has been said above (q. 23, a. 4), pleasure is a kind of rest of the appetite in a suitable good, while sorrow arises from something repugnant to the appetite. Hence in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what in bodies rest is to weariness, which occurs from a non-natural alteration; for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all rest of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by mitigating any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.

Article 2

Whether sorrow is mitigated by weeping

Objections:

It seems that weeping does not mitigate sorrow.

2. For as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy. Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.

Response:

It should be said that tears and groans naturally mitigate sorrow, for two reasons. First, because every hurtful thing hurts even more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it, whereas if it be poured out outwardly, the soul’s intention is dispersed as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. And for this reason, when men who are in sorrow manifest their sorrow outwardly, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is mitigated. Secondly, because an action that befits a man according to the disposition he has is always pleasant to him. But weeping and groaning are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain, and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as was said above (a. 1), every pleasure mitigates sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is mitigated by weeping and groans.

Article 3

Whether sorrow is mitigated by the sympathy of friends

Response:

It should be said that when one is in sorrow, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation, for which the Philosopher indicates a twofold reason (Ethics IX, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight from which we strive to unburden ourselves, so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason is because when a man’s friends sorrow in sympathy with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this gives him pleasure, as was said above (q. 32, a. 5). Hence, since every pleasure mitigates sorrow, as was said above (a. 1), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.

Article 4

Whether the contemplation of truth mitigates sorrow

Response:

It should be said that as was said above (q. 3, a. 5), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure mitigates pain, as was said above (a. 1); hence the contemplation of truth mitigates pain or sorrow, and more so to the degree that one is more perfectly a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of divine things and of future happiness, according to James 1:2: “My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall meet various trials”; and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily tortures this joy is found; as the “martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: It seems to me that I am walking on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ.” [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.]

Article 5

Whether sleep and baths mitigates sorrow

Response:

It should be said that as was said above (q. 37, a. 4), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is opposed to the vital movement of the body, and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and mitigates it. Moreover such remedies, precisely by bringing nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is what makes pleasure, as was said above (q. 31, a. 1). Therefore, since every pleasure mitigates sorrow, sorrow is mitigated by such bodily remedies.

Question 39

Question 39

On the goodness and badness of sorrow or pain

Article 1

Whether all sorrow is evil

Response:

It should be said that something may be good or evil in two ways: (1) in one way, considered simply and in itself, and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the mere fact of a man’s appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the rest of the appetite in good. (2) In another way something is said to be good or evil on the supposition of something else, as shame is said to be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethics IV, 9. Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on account of this present evil. For if he were not in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he felt it not, or because he did not reckon it as something unsuitable to him, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (On Genesis According to the Letter VIII, 14): “It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of good.” Because, however, in the science of morals, we consider things individually—since actions are concerned about individuals—that which is good on some supposition should be considered as good, just as that which is voluntary on some supposition is judged to be voluntary, as is said in Ethics III, 1, and likewise above (q. 6, a. 6).

Article 2

Whether sorrow can be a noble good

[Summary of article]

When inner sorrow proceeds from a right judgment of reason regarding an evil, and a right movement of will rejecting that evil, it is a noble good.

Article 3

Whether sorrow can be a useful good

Response:

It should be said that a twofold movement of the appetite arises from a present evil. One is that the appetite is opposed to the present evil, and in this respect sorrow is not useful, since that which is present, cannot be not present.

The other movement that arises in the appetite is for avoiding or expelling the saddening evil, and in this respect sorrow is useful, if it is for something which ought to be avoided. For something should be avoided for two reasons. (1) First, on its own account, due to its being contrary to good, as for example, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin; hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): “I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance.” (2) In another way a thing should be avoided not as though evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil, either through one’s being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one’s being precipitated by it into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods. And in this respect sorrow for temporal goods may be useful, according to Eccles. 7:3: “It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all.”

Now the reason why sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, is that it adds another motive for avoiding it. For the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided, while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.

Question 40

Question 40

On hope

Article 8

Whether hope contributes to activity, or impedes it

Response:

It should be said that hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense, and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object, which is a difficult but possible good. For the judgment of its being difficult arouses our attention, while the judgment that it is possible does not hold back our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. For hope, as was said above (q. 32, a. 3), causes pleasure, which is a help to action, as was said above (q. 33, a. 4). Therefore hope is an aid to action.

Question 44

Question 44

On the effects of fear

Article 2

Whether fear makes one apt for deliberating²

Response:

It should be said that being apt for deliberating may be taken in two ways. First, from being willing or anxious to deliberate. And thus fear makes men apt for deliberating.... Now things which make us afraid are not merely evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as was said above (q. 42, a. 2). Hence men seek to deliberate especially when they are afraid.

Secondly, being apt for deliberating refers to the ability to deliberate well, and in this sense neither fear nor any passion makes men apt for deliberating. For when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really are, as to a lover, what he loves seems better, and to him who fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing to the defect of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the ability of deliberating well.

Article 4

Whether fear impedes activity

Objections:

It seems that fear impedes activity.

1. For activity is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs activity. But fear disturbs reason, as was said above (a. 2). Therefore fear hinders activity.

2. Further, those who fear while doing anything, fail more easily, as a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders activity.

On the contrary:

The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): “With fear and trembling work out your salvation”; and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to good activity. Therefore fear does not hinder good activity.

Response:

It should be said that man’s exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear considered in itself is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, not disturbing the reason very much, it conduces to acting well, insofar as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man deliberate and act with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.

Replies to objections:

1. And from this the reply to the first is evident.

2. To the second it should be said that he who falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination through fear of the fall that he imagines.

Question 48

Question 48

On the effects of anger

Article 3

Whether anger most of all hinders the use of reason

Objections:

It seems that anger does not hinder the use of reason.

2. For the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethics VII, 6) that “an angry man is not cunning but is open.” Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethics VII, 6.).

Response:

It should be said that although the mind or reason does not use a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it was said (a. 2) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions, anger most manifestly hinders the judgment of reason, according to Ps. 30:10: “My eye is troubled with wrath.”

Replies to objections:

2. To the second it should be said that an angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethics IV, 3) that “he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly.” Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.